Gnss Interference Threats And Countermeasures Pdf

  • and pdf
  • Wednesday, May 26, 2021 5:44:42 PM
  • 2 comment
gnss interference threats and countermeasures pdf

File Name: gnss interference threats and countermeasures .zip
Size: 2877Kb
Published: 26.05.2021

Future Security : Future Security pp Cite as.

GNSS Cybersecurity Threats: An International Law Perspective

Hostile cyber operations such as jamming and spoofing of GNSS signals are a growing concern. While they do not cause major damages to the satellite navigation system as such, they can have severe effects on critical national infrastructures and many other systems. Here, we address how international telecommunications law as well as the international law on the prevention of war apply in this context. Warfare is increasingly shifting from physical to virtual. States are already conducting, or at least are preparing, to wage war in cyberspace.

Overall, there is not yet commonly agreed terminology. Use of the above-mentioned terms does not necessarily imply that the cyber operations in question can be qualified as an attack, an act of war, or as interference in terms of law. To avoid confusion and legal pre-judgements, in the following the more generic term hostile cyber operations is used. Hostile cyber operations pose significant threats to space assets.

Global navigation satellite satellites GNSS are specifically vulnerable in this respect considering the very low power of their signals and services.

Due to their importance for military operations, for critical national infrastructure and key economic sectors, they may also constitute primary targets in future warfare.

Several incidents of hostile cyber operations against GNSS, namely caused by jamming and spoofing, have been reported. Other types of operations against space assets, such as hacking or eavesdropping of communications satellite systems, are also technically possible, even if no cases have been publicly reported so far.

Cases of jamming are often not intentional and often have only very short-term and geographically limited impacts. They only concern the national sphere of a State and are not caused by other State actors.

However, hostile cyber operations are also conducted by States or non-State actors attributable to them. This is where international law becomes relevant. This article explores the international law applicable to hostile cyber operations against GNSS. Some commentators argue that international law falls silent in the face of the challenges of the digital age.

However, it is common consensus among States that existing international law is also applicable to cyber operations, though most of the rules that may come into play were developed before the digital age. It is thus required to assess how to apply existing rules to hostile cyber operations. Legal aspects associated to hostile cyber operations against GNSS mainly concern international telecommunications law, namely the ITU body of agreements and regulations on the use of radio frequencies, as well as the international law on the prevention of war ius contra bellum.

The functioning of GNSS is dependent on the use of dedicated radio frequencies. In its Art. As regards the utilization of this limited natural resource, Art.

According to Art 1. In the context of GNSS, interference is to be considered as harmful interference to the extent that unwanted energy endangers the functioning of a radio navigation service provided by such systems or prevents the proper use of such service. No ITU definition or rule specifically distinguishes between intentional and unintentional harmful interference. With multiple technologies, systems and operators operating in frequency bands for the radio-navigation service or nearby, the potential for unintentional interference is generally growing.

Hostile cyber operations against GNSS, however, clearly fall in the category of intentional harmful interference. Under the ITU Radio Regulations, States have the obligation to stop harmful interference to stations of other countries, independent whether the interference is caused by public or private stations. When an administration so requests, the Bureau shall, using such means at its disposal as are appropriate in the circumstances, conduct a study of reported cases of alleged contravention or non-observance of these Regulations and shall prepare a report for consideration by the Board, including draft recommendations to the administrations concerned.

Cases of unintentional interference can usually be solved by way of these procedures. However, the RRB lacks appropriate enforcement measures of any decisions taken in case of intentional harmful interference. The attention of the Radio Regulations Board RRB and of recent World Radio Conferences has been called to such issues, and WRC confirmed that any transmission which has the intent to cause harmful interference to stations of other administrations is an infringement of the ITU Constitution, Convention or Radio Regulations, and, that any station operating in the territory of an administration is under the authority of that administration, even if the station is not authorized.

ITU appeals to all its Member States to exercise the utmost goodwill and provide mutual assistance in the application of Article 45 of the ITU Constitution with a view to definitively settling any ongoing and future issues of harmful interference. Through the ITU, and eventually other through competent international organizations as well as diplomatic interventions, pressure can be increased on a State to stop harmful interference and to comply with its international law obligations.

Not all cases will, however, be resolved by such means. Under international law on the prevention of war, hostile cyber operations against GNSS can eventually be considered as a threat or use of force Art. Countermeasures by the affected State may also be employed in response to hostile cyber operations against GNSS that constitute a breach of any other international obligation internationally wrongful act.

Subject to specific conditions, hostile cyber operations may even be considered as an armed attack, allowing States affected to undertake individual action under the right of self-defence Art. Bearing in mind the potentially severe consequences of hostile cyber operations against GNSS, actions of the affected State in response may be based on the so-called plea of necessity. Collective action in response to hostile cyber operations against GNSS may be authorized by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter when it determines that the respective cyber operation is a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.

The question is therefore not whether the prohibition of the threat or use of force is applicable to hostile cyber operations against GNSS but rather when it applies. In absence of a conclusive definitional threshold, several factors were determined for assessing whether to qualify a cyber operation as a use of force. These factors include:. Based on these considerations, a hostile cyber operation against GNSS can be qualified as an illegal use of force when its scale and effects meet a threshold that is comparable to non-cyber operations rising to the level of a use of force.

This needs to be carefully considered on a case-by-case basis, bearing in mind the above factors. The classification of hostile cyber operations as a threat or use of force is not tantamount to an armed attack. Only the latter would grant the State affected the right to self-defense.

Within the framework of the right of self-defense, a State can react to an armed attack with its own use of force, without itself violating the prohibition of the use of force. Whether this threshold for an armed attack is exceeded is subject to consideration in each individual case.

In order to cross the threshold of an armed attack, hostile cyber operations against GNSS must therefore have significant and immediate destructive effects, either on the GNSS itself or indirectly. If hostile cyber operations can be considered an armed attack, states are not limited in their right to self-defense to own cyber operations.

According to the principle of proportionality, the right self-defense is however limited to what is necessary for repelling of an armed attack. Conversely, if a hostile cyber operation is not to be considered an armed attack, affected States must resort to measures other than the use of force, such as countermeasures or measures compatible with the plea of necessity. A State shall, furthermore, not exercise its right of self-defense when the UN Security Council has already taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security under the system of collective security laid down in Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

A State may always initiate countermeasures in response to hostile cyber operations against GNSS short of armed attacks, as far as such operations constitute a violation of international obligations and are conducted by or attributable to a State internationally wrongful act.

Countermeasures are possible in response to threat or use of force, harmful interference, or violation of an obligation under international law. Countermeasures are acts or omissions of the affected State against the responsible State which, in principle, would violate international obligations of the former towards the latter, but are justified as countermeasures because of the internationally wrongful act. An affected State may therefore be entitled to act contrary to its international law obligations to ensure that the other State refrains from hostile cyber operations.

Limitations on the use of countermeasures in the context of cyber operations include that. A State affected by hostile cyber operation against GNSS, which represents a serious and imminent danger to an essential interest of the affected States, may invoke the so-called plea of necessity. Actions in response to such serious and imminent peril to an essential interest may also include actions which would otherwise be illegal under international law when doing so is the sole means of safeguarding it.

Unlike countermeasures, the plea of necessity does not require that the peril is attributable to another State, nor does it require the prior unlawful conduct of another State.

Thus, a State may resort to the plea of necessity in response to hostile cyber operations against GNSS, if the exact nature and origin of such operations are unclear or if the operations cannot be reliably attributed to another State. To safeguard against possible abuse, these special features make it necessary that the plea of necessity is subject to strict limitations. These limitations include:. If the UN Security Council determines that there is a threat to peace, a breach of peace or an attack, it will decide which measures are to be taken to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Within this context, the UN Security Council may authorize measures which may not necessarily involve the deployment of armed forces or measures by air, sea or land. In fact, measures approved by the UN Security Council as a reaction could also include cyber operations. Depending on the individual case and its specific implications, the UN Security Council may determine that hostile cyber operations against GNSS pose a threat to peace, a breach of peace or an act of aggression.

While the Security Council must determine that one of these cases is met, it has become standard practice for the Security Council to make a general statement in the respective resolution that it is acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In practice, this is done by using a signal with the same frequency but with significantly higher power.

From a technical point of view, the term satellite jamming thus refers to the flooding or overpowering of the targeted radio frequencies with electronic noise, so that the disturbed signals do not reach their destination.

Spoofing, in contrast, refers to the mimicking of the characteristics of a true signal so that the user receives the counterfeit spoofed signal instead of the real one.

In June , a team at the University of Texas at Austin demonstrated the controlled capture of a civil drone using spoofing technology. Neither jamming nor spoofing directly cause physical damage or destruction of the station emitting or receiving GNSS signals. As a direct consequence, they result in. However, the partial and complete loss of PNT services or jumps in time, position, or direction may have severe secondary effects, some of which may affect critical national infrastructures or other important systems and applications.

In the following, some examples of reported cases are provided. Due to the failure, the system for tracking arriving aircraft at the airport did not function correctly. In the harbour, the traffic management system failed. The Naval Medical Centre reported a malfunction of its medical paging system.

In addition, disbursement orders at ATMs were rejected. According to reports, the failure was related to unintentional interference caused by a U. Navy training exercise. In March , a South Korean representative informed the general public that GPS signals in Seoul and Incheon were being jammed by radio waves from beyond the national border.

Between June and October , over spoofing incidents were reported in the Black Sea. Spurious GPS signals allegedly placed seagoing vessels hundreds of miles from their true position.

Whilst some commentators presumed that Russia was testing a new system for spoofing GPS, others concluded that the spoofing was probably not done on purpose, but rather resulted from a GPS re-radiator transmitter located at an airport. In October , the Finnish and Norwegian aviation authorities issued a warning to commercial pilots operating flights in the Arctic Circle. According to this warning, GPS signals in the region were severely disturbed, so pilots were advised to use other navigation methods to land at the northernmost airports of the countries.

Some Norwegian representatives speculated that this was just a careless side effect of Russian military exercises. Others presumed that they were part of a larger geopolitical strategy. Irrespective whether or not the above-mentioned incidents were deliberately caused by hostile cyber operations of States, they provide clear evidence on the potential secondary effects of jamming and spoofing of GNSS signals on critical national infrastructures and many other systems and applications.

Receivers struggle in built-up environments. Meanwhile, the threats posed by accidental and deliberate interference and cyber-attack are steadily evolving. Bearing in mind the potential effects of GNSS jamming and spoofing on critical infrastructures, the questions arise as to whether these effects reach the threshold of harmful interference, of the threat or use of force, or of an armed attack and what actions can lawfully be undertaken by affected States.

Jamming and Spoofing in GPS/GNSS Based Applications and Services – Threats and Countermeasures

Radio frequency interference detection and mitigation are becoming of paramount importance due to the increasing number of services and applications based on the position obtained by means of Global Navigation Satellite Systems. A way to cope with such threats is the implementation in the receiver of advanced signal processing algorithm able to raise proper warning or improve the receiver performance. In this paper, we propose a method based on the Wavelet Transform able to split the useful signal from the interfering component in a transformed domain. The wavelet packet decomposition and proper statistical thresholds allow the algorithm to show very good performance in case of multiple pulse interference as well as in the case of narrowband interference, two scenarios in which traditional countermeasures might not be effective. Reliable positioning and navigation are becoming imperative in a growing number of applications that are being developed for public services and safety critical purposes.

Since the global positioning system receivers on the surface of the Earth use satellite signals sent from a remote distance and the intensity of received signals is weak, they are vulnerable to jamming. This paper implements a vector-tracking loop VTL -based global navigation satellite system GNSS receiver algorithm as an anti-jamming technique and compares the performance of VTL-based receivers with that of scalar-tracking loop STL that is used in general GNSS receivers at various jamming environments and a vehicle's dynamics. GPS receiver ; anti-jamming ; vector tracking loop ; dynamic conditions. Download PDF. Article Info.

Please note: In order to keep Hive up to date and provide users with the best features, we are no longer able to fully support Internet Explorer. The site is still available to you, however some sections of the site may appear broken. We would encourage you to move to a more modern browser like Firefox, Edge or Chrome in order to experience the site fully. Where the Crawdads Sing is at once an exquisite ode to the natural world, a heart-breaking coming-of-age story, and a surprising tale of possible murder. Includes new renditions of some of the Bee Gees' biggest hits, that Barry Gibb has re-recorded with several of the world's biggest country artists. Download - Immediately Available.

GNSS Interference Threats & Countermeasures

The system can't perform the operation now. Try again later. Citations per year. Duplicate citations. The following articles are merged in Scholar.

Hostile cyber operations such as jamming and spoofing of GNSS signals are a growing concern. While they do not cause major damages to the satellite navigation system as such, they can have severe effects on critical national infrastructures and many other systems. Here, we address how international telecommunications law as well as the international law on the prevention of war apply in this context. Warfare is increasingly shifting from physical to virtual.

International Journal of Navigation and Observation

Skip to Main Content. A not-for-profit organization, IEEE is the world's largest technical professional organization dedicated to advancing technology for the benefit of humanity. Use of this web site signifies your agreement to the terms and conditions. In particular, critical applications such as aviation can be severely affected by un-detected and un-mitigated interference and therefore interference management solutions are crucial to be employed. Methods to cope with such intentional interference enclose interference detection, interference mitigation, interference classification, and interference localization.

Будь он менее самонадеян, он, конечно же, заглянул бы в энциклопедию и обнаружил, что это не что иное, как солевой осадок, оставшийся после высыхания древних морей. Как и все криптографы АНБ, Хейл зарабатывал огромные деньги, однако вовсе не стремился держать этот факт при. Он ездил на белом лотосе с люком на крыше и звуковой системой с мощными динамиками. Кроме того, он был фанатом всевозможных прибамбасов, и его автомобиль стал своего рода витриной: он установил в нем компьютерную систему глобального позиционирования, замки, приводящиеся в действие голосом, пятиконечный подавитель радаров и сотовый телефонфакс, благодаря которому всегда мог принимать сообщения на автоответчик. На номерном знаке авто была надпись МЕГАБАЙТ в обрамлении сиреневой неоновой трубки. Ранняя юность Грега Хейла не была омрачена криминальными историями, поскольку он провел ее в Корпусе морской пехоты США, где и познакомился с компьютером.

Британского флага нигде не было. Ясно, что ему не удастся влиться в это море, которое раздавит его, как утлую лодчонку. Рядом с ним кого-то рвало. Хорошенькая картинка. Беккер застонал и начал выбираться из расписанного краской из баллончиков зала.

GNSS Interference Threats and Countermeasures

Вы всегда добиваетесь своего… вы добьетесь… Да, - подумал.  - Я добиваюсь своих целей, но честь для меня важнее. Я скорее предпочту умереть, чем жить в тени позора.

Католицизм здесь посильнее, чем в самом Ватикане. - У нас, конечно, не все его тело, - добавил лейтенант.  - Solo el escroto.


  1. Alacoque T. 02.06.2021 at 04:08

    The rabbit who wants to fall asleep free online pdf calculus with applications 11th edition free pdf

  2. Bookselectka 02.06.2021 at 08:10

    Environmental ecology biodiversity and climate change pdf the unfinished journey america since world war ii 8th edition pdf